ABSTRACT In this paper, we focus on differential cryptanalysis of a lightweight ARX cipher. These ciphers use three simple arithmetic operations, namely, modular addition, bitwise rotation, and exclusive-OR, and therefore, are designed very well to perform over the Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. We choose a very well-known ARX cipher designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States of America in June 2013, named SPECK. SPECK was subjected to several years of detailed cryptanalytic analysis within NSA and has been subjected to academic analysis by researchers worldwide. SPECK is specially optimized for low-cost processors like those used in the IoT devices. We first find the differential paths for all the variants of SPECK, and based on that differential path, we attack the round-reduced variant of the cipher. Finding differential paths in ARX is one of the most difficult and time-consuming problems due to the huge state space. We use a nested-based heuristic technique to find a differential path which is inspired by the nested Monte Carlo search (NMCS) algorithm. NMCS was successfully applied before for different games: Morpion Solitaire, SameGame, and 16×16 Sudoku, but the use of such heuristic techniques in cryptography is entirely new and time-saving.
I. INTRODUCTION
ARX(Addition/Rotation/XOR) is a class of cryptographic algorithms which use three simple arithmetic operations: namely modular addition, bitwise rotation and exclusive-OR. In both industry and academia, ARX cipher has gained a lot more interest and attention in the last few years. By using combined linear (XOR, bit shift, bit rotation) and nonlinear (modular addition) operations and iterating them for many rounds, ARX algorithms have become more resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. ARX lacks a look-up table, associated with S-box based algorithms, and therefore has an increased resistance against side-channel attacks. Due to the simplicity of operations, ARX algorithms exhibit excellent performance, especially for software platforms used for IoT devices. After mobile internet technologies and the World Wide Web, the time has come for Internet of Things (IoT). IoT consists of devices responsible for generating, processing and exchanging privacy-sensitive information. It has a broad range of applications including health management, smart homes, traffic, agriculture, weather monitoring just to name a few. IoT devices are lightweight and also have shallow energy footprints. This small amount of available energy is generally used to execute core application functionality and therefore supporting other challenges of security and privacy is quite challenging. Due to lightweight encryption methods, ARX ciphers are well suited for IoT devices.
In our analysis, we focus on SPECK [1] . SPECK is a secure, flexible and lightweight block cipher designed by researchers from the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States of America (USA) in June 2013. It is known for great performance both in software and hardware applications. Its design is similar to Threefish -the block cipher used in the hash function Skein [2] . SPECK is a pure ARX cipher with a Feistel-like structure in which both branches are modified at every round. SPECK consist of 5 variants SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128 with block sizes 32, 48, 64, 96 and 128 bits, respectively.
The cryptanalysis of ARX design is more difficult. Since a typical S-box consists of 4 or 8-bit words, the differential or linear properties can be evaluated by computing its difference distribution table (DDT) or linear approximation table (LAT) respectively. But with regards to ARX, for a 32-bit word it is clearly infeasible to calculate these tables. However, a partial difference distribution table (pDDT) containing just a few fractions of all differentials that has a probability greater than some fixed threshold is still a viable option. This becomes possible due to the fact that the probabilities of XOR (respectively ADD) differentials through the modular addition (respectively XOR) operation are monotonously decreasing with the bit size of the word.
In this paper, we propose a method for finding good differential paths in ARX ciphers. Finding a differential trail becomes a problem since a huge state space exists and there is no clear and obvious way to take the next ''step''. This kind of problem exists in different areas, but our inspiration comes from single-player games such as Morpion solitaire, SameGame and Soduku. The heuristics called Nested MonteCarlo Search works very well for these games as shown in [3] . We can treat a search for good differential paths also as a single-player game and argue that this approach could be a base for more sophisticated heuristics. However, our modified algorithm depends on the technical complexity of this problem, but it is also strongly inspired by Nested MonteCarlo Search.
In [4] and [5] , we applied a naive approach algorithm to all variants of SPECK and found good results only for one variant with the smallest state size in SPECK32. For bigger variants, our algorithm was demanding to reduce the search space to enhance the random decision process and therefore we used the partial difference distribution table (pDDT) [6] to reduce the search space of our algorithm. In another work [5] , we applied this advance method to ARX cipher LEA and found differential path for 13 rounds.
Besides the concept of pDDT our inspiration is drawn from the highways and country roads analogy proposed by Biryukov and Velichkov [6] and Biryukov et al. [8] . We relate the problem of finding high probability differential trails in a cipher to the problem of finding fast routes between two cities on a roadmap, then differentials that have high probability (with respect to a fixed threshold) can be thought of as highways and conversely differentials with low probability can be viewed as slow roads or country roads. Therefore, our algorithm first tries to find a probability above the threshold probability and if such a probability does not exist, then it uses the low probability values. Using this concept, the algorithm does not take a completely random decision in iterations and hence improves the random decision process by using a much smaller search space.
II. RELATED WORK
Biryukov and Velichkov [6] published a paper where they analyzed ARX cipher SPECK and by introducing the concept of partial difference distribution table (pDDT) they extend Matsui's algorithm, originally proposed for DES-like ciphers, to the class of ARX ciphers. They found differential trails of 9, 10 and 13 rounds for 3 variant SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64, respectively.
Biryukov et al. [7] again presented a paper where they propose the adaptation of Matsui's algorithm for finding the best differential and linear trails to the class of ARX ciphers. It was based on a branch-and-bound search strategy which does not use any heuristics and returns optimal results. They report the probabilities of the best differential trails for up to 10, 9, 8, 7 and 7 rounds of SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128, respectively.
Song et al. [8] presented a paper where they develop Mouha et al.'s framework for finding differential characteristics by adding a new method to construct long characteristics from short ones. They report the probabilities of the best differential trails of SPECK for up to 10, 11, 15, 17 , and 20 rounds of SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128, respectively.
In the context of security of IoT devices data, we have seen some strong work recently by Wu et al. [10] - [13] . They have been able to focus on security of IoT and Big Data. Both of which are important factors going forward with Smart City design and implementation.
The SIMON and SPECK families of block ciphers were designed specifically to offer security on constrained devices, where simplicity of design is crucial [13] . The NSA developed the SPECK as an aid for securing applications in very constrained environments where AES may not be suitable, such as IoT [14] . Specifically, in [15] , results brought some new insights into the question of how well lightweight ciphers like SPECK are suited to secure the Internet of things.
III. DESCRIPTION OF SPECK
SPECK is a family of lightweight block ciphers with the Feistel-like structure in which each block is divided into two branches, and both branches are modified at every round. It has 5 variants, SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128, where a number in the name denotes the block size in bits. Each block size is divided into two parts, the left half and right half.
ROUND FUNCTION
SPECK uses 3 basic operations on n-bit words for each round:
• bitwise XOR, ⊕, • addition modulo 2 n , • left and right circular shifts by r 2 and r 1 bits, respectively. Left half n-bit word is denoted by X r−1,L and right half n-bit word is denoted by X r−1,R to the r-th round and n-bit round key applied in the r-th round is denoted by k r . X r,L and X r,R denotes output words from round r which are computed as follows: We can clearly visualize the round function of SPECK in Figure 1 . Different key sizes have been used by several instances of the SPECK family and the total number of rounds depends on the key size. The value of rotation constant r 1 and r 2 are specified as: r 1 = 7, r 2 = 2 for SPECK32 and r 1 = 8, r 2 = 3 for all other variants. Parameters for all variants represented in Table 1 .
IV. CALCULATING DIFFERENTIAL PROBABILITIES
Lipmaa and Moriai [17] studied the differential properties of addition. Let xdp + (a, b → c) be the XOR-differential probability of addition modulo 2 n , with input differences a and b and output difference c. Lipmaa and Moriai [17] proved that the differential (a, b → c) is valid if and only if:
where
For every valid differential (a, b → c), we define the weight w(a, b → c) of the differential as follows:
The weight of a valid differential can then be calculated as:
where h * (x) denotes the number of non-zero bits in x, not counting
A differential characteristic defines not only the input and output differences but also the internal differences after every round of the iterated cipher. In our analysis, we follow a common assumption that the probability of a valid differential characteristic is equal to the multiplication of the probabilities of each addition operation. The XOR operation and bit rotation are linear in GF(2), therefore for these two operations for every input difference there is only one valid output difference.
V. PARTIAL DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION TABLES (PDDT)
Partial difference distribution table (pDDT) proposed by Biryukov and Velichkov [6] is a table that contains all XOR differentials (a, b → c) whose differential probabilities (DP) are greater than or equal to a pre-defined threshold p thres .
To compute pDDT efficiently, we will use the following proposition: The differential probability (DP) of XOR of addition modulo 2 n is monotonously decreasing with the word size of differences a, b, c.
where In our nested algorithm. shown in Algorithm 1, we set the threshold value equal to 0.1 and therefore the size of our algorithms search space is equal to 3951388 from Table 2 . If we decrease the value of threshold the size of search space will increase depending on the threshold value and the differential path computational speed of our algorithm will decrease in equal proportion.
VI. NESTED MONTE CARLO SEARCH
Our algorithm is inspired by Nested Monte Carlo Search (NMCS) algorithms. The Monte Carlo method is a heuristic based random sampling method. Coulom [19] proposed an application to game-tree search based on Monte Carlo method in 2007 named as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). This algorithm was useful to games where it is hard to formulate an evaluation function, such as the game of Go. Later for a single player game, a variant called Nested Monte Carlo Search has been proposed in [3] .
Let us take a tree-like structure to understand the Nested Monte-Carlo Search algorithm. At each step, the NMCS algorithm tries all possible moves and memorizes the move associated with the best score of the lower level searches. In other words, a nested move of level 1 makes a playout for every possible move and chooses to play the move of the best playout. A nested move of level 2 does the same thing except that it replaces the playout by a nested move of level one.
During the first iteration the initial state (root) is selected, and for the selected state all legal moves are determined ( Figure 2 ). Therefore at level 0 it plays the random game for all possible moves valid for selected state (root). Then it moves one step ahead to the next level with the greatest associated score.
Therefore, we changed the original NMCS algorithm to eliminate this problem for our cipher and presented a new algorithm based on NMCS with an example in the next paragraph. Instead of trying all possible moves, we try only one random move.
The problem of finding a differential path in a cipher with high probability could be treated as the problem of finding fast routes between two cities on a roadmap. Let us try to understand the algorithm in this context. Our goal is to find the shortest path from one city to another city. We represent all possible paths as a tree, as shown in Figure 3 . The root of the tree is considered as the starting point, and all leaves are end points reached by different paths (nodes). Each edge between nodes is associated with a number which represents the distance between the two nodes. Initially, we have two lists named BestPath and CurrentPath. They represent the best available path from previous searches and a random path which is under investigation, respectively. The last element in both lists represents total distance traveled. Both the lists are initially empty. no better path available (BestPath is empty), then we save the current path and its distance as BestPath (See Figure 4 ).
Again we move one level down in BestPath and start a new random move from the node. Therefore in our example we will start from node b, and we found a new random path {b, e, k}. The new path score (including the distance above b) is 10, which is better than the previous best path score. Therefore we update BestPath by CurrentPath a, b, e, k and update the score also (See Figure 5) .
Again in the BestPath we go one step down and repeat the same process. We play a random move from e and find the new path is {e, j}(See Figure 6 .) The score for CurrentPath is 15, which is not better than the previous best path. Hence, we do not update BestPath.
Once we reach the leaf node, we repeat the whole process from the base node. This time BestPath would not be empty, as there would be some result from the previous search. In this kind of problem, we often face the exploration versus exploitation dilemma when searching for a new path. In our algorithm, by letting it investigate entirely new paths (starting randomly from the base node), the algorithm ''cares'' about exploration. On the other hand, by investigating BestPath on the subsequent levels of the tree, we exploit BestPath and hope to improve it.
VII. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR ALGORITHM BASED ON NMCS
To formally describe the algorithm, let us first define two functions, which are the main building blocks of the algorithm. The first function RandomPath(node_position) is the function, which for a given node walks a random path in the search tree until it reaches the leaf node. The function RandomPath returns a list of nodes (from the base node to the leaf) and the cost corresponding to the path. while node_position = leaf do 3: go randomly to the next node 4: end while 5: return path, cost 6 : end function
The second function Nested(node_position) is a recursive function, which calls itself on every level of the tree search until it reaches the leaf node. The pseudo-code of the function is given in Algorithm 2. In the given pseudo-code we use two global variables, which keep a list of nodes in the best path (best_path) and its corresponding cost (best_cost). Initially, best_path is empty and best_cost is initialized with some big value. (Here we assume that a lower cost means a better solution.) while not end of the rounds do 3: if (st 0 and st 1 ) ∈ pDDT then 4: Add differential output and the weight to the 5: path and weight list, respectively weight using method described in section IV) 10: Add differential output op and the weight wt 11: to the path and weight list, respectively 12: end if 13: SPECK Encryption operations 14: end while 15: return path, weight 16: end function
Algorithm 3 The Recursive Function Nested
The Nested function can be called iteratively in a loop until we meet our criterion as shown in Algorithm 3. The criterion could be, for example, a number of iterations, time limit or the maximum cost of the best path. The algorithm could also be easily run in parallel. We can do this either with completely independent instances or with a small overhead to communicate best solutions between instances.
VIII. FINDING DIFFERENTIAL PATHS
In SPECK cipher, the only source of non-linearity is the modular addition, and its complete differential properties (differential distribution tables) are infeasible to calculate. Therefore, we use our heuristics algorithm to circumvent this limitation and to find the best differential trails. As described earlier, the algorithm takes a random decision from the search space. For the larger variant of SPECK this random property of the algorithm is not enough to produce good results. Therefore, we decide to reduce the search space of the algorithm by introducing a partial difference distribution table (pDDT). This table is used in our algorithm and instead of taking random inputs for SPECK, we take the initial inputs from pDDT table, which contains valid differentials above the threshold value. We show the details in Algorithm VIII. Each time SPECK starts the next round, the algorithm initially checks the values in the pDDT table. If it does not find such a value in the pDDT set, it simply calculates a valid differential output for given inputs, without any threshold condition. In our experiment with SPECK cipher, modular addition for each round is treated as a node where we need while not end of the rounds do 3: temp_path_list, temp_weight = FIND-BEST- 4: PATH(st 0 ,st 1 , rounds) 5: if (temp_weight +weight_above < best_weight) then 6: best_weight = temp_weight +weight_above 7: Update best_path_list by temp_path_list (from 8: current round to end of the round) 9: Update weight_list by temp_weight (from 10: current round to end of the round) 11: end if 12: update st 0 and st 1 from best_path_list with the 13: decision for current rounds 14: weight_above = weight from first round to current 15: speck round 16: rounds = rounds + 1 17: end while 18 Take the i th indexed value of st 0 , st 1 from pDDT list 3: path, best_weight = Nested (st 0 , st 1 ,) 4: rounds, best_weight, weight_above 5: i = i + 1 6: end while to take a decision of required output (valid differential) and the weight of a valid differential is treated as a score. Our aim is to find a different path for a given number of rounds with lower weight.
The basic FIND-BEST-PATH function runs the cipher for a given number of rounds. The function checks the differential values in the pDDT table having a probability greater than some threshold value. In case the algorithm does not find such a value in the table then it calculates a valid differential output by XOR-ing the two inputs, which gives the highest probability with given inputs (best possible path for given differences). We have not mentioned the SPECK encryption operations in the algorithm for simplicity, and it is trivial that after each round of encryption st 0 and st 1 changes its value and every time we check these two values in the pDDT table list.
To calculate the differential path by our algorithm using the pDDT table, we use the main function in Algorithm 6. The calculated weight from round 1 to the current round is represented by weight_above. The two lists weight_list and best_path_list saves the weight and list of the path for each decision from one round onwards. Both lists are initially empty, and the value of weight_above and best_weight given to algorithm is 0 and 9999 respectively. Every time the weight_list and best_path_list is updated with the newly found sequence, and the best move is played. The total number of rounds for which we are trying to find the lowest weight is represented by srounds. The first and second half block of SPECK cipher is represented by st 0 and st 1 .
We can now call NESTED in a loop until a criterion is met (for example best weight threshold).
IX. OBTAINING LONG CHARACTERISTIC
It is easier to find a short characteristic (for a small number of rounds) instead of a long characteristic. Therefore, we use the start-in-the-middle approach to find a long characteristic from two shorter ones. In this method, we start our algorithm from the middle of the rounds in two directions, forward and backwards. In this experiment, we apply internal difference inputs from in the middle of the given number of rounds. For example, if we want to find a path for 14 rounds, then we pass inputs to our algorithm and let it run for 7 rounds in the forward direction and 7 rounds in backwards (reverse) direction. Once results from both are achieved, we combine them to get a long characteristic of 14 rounds. This method also increases time efficiency and provides better results.
X. RESULTS
In this paper, we use our naive algorithm extended with the partial difference distribution table (pDDT) for finding the best differential trails in ARX cipher SPECK. We show the practical application of the new method on round-reduced variants of block cipher from the SPECK family. For the 32-bit state of the cipher, it only makes sense to analyze the differential paths with probability higher than 2 −32 . It is because a path with lower probability would not lead to any meaningful attack, which would be faster than exhaustive search in the 32-bit state. Similarly for SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128 probability should be higher than 2 −48 , 2 −64 , 2 −96 and 2 −128 respectively. We run the experiments for long characteristics starting from the first round.
We report the differential path in Appendix I (Table 3,4) for up to 8, 9, 11, 10 and 11 rounds of SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128 respectively. In the table left and right part of the state are denoted by L and R , respectively. Differences are encoded as hexadecimal numbers (Probability for a given weight is 2 −weight ).
In the second part, we also perform the experiment starting from the middle round and run our tool in both directions, reverse as well as forward. Using this method we improved our results and report the differential path in Appendix I (Table 6,7) for up to 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15 rounds of SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128 respectively. For variants with larger block size, say 96 or 128, we achieved better results. Dinur [20] proposed an enumeration technique for key recovery in differential attacks against SPECK. Consider we have differential characteristic of SPECK2n/mn with r number of rounds that has probability p > 2·2 −2n . The technique can be used to recover (r + m) rounds. We first attack (r + m) rounds with the value m = 2. The number of plaintexts required to recover the key will be 2·p −1 with an average time complexity of 2 · p −1 · 2 (m−2)n encryptions. Then we can extend the attack to the remaining instances, with m = 3 and m = 4.
XI. DIFFERENTIAL ATTACKS
Let us take one variant SPECK32, we have 8 rounds differential characteristics with probability 2 −30 . Combined with Dinur's enumeration technique for key recovery, given differential characteristics can be used to attack 12-round SPECK32 with 2·2 30 = 2·2 31 plaintexts and 2·2 30 ·2 32 = 2 63 encryptions.
XII. CONCLUSION
By applying our algorithm based on Nested and by reducing the search space using the partial difference distribution table (pDDT) to all five instances of block cipher SPECK, we obtain better results for all variants. Another method we attempted was starting from the middle and working in both directions. This method produced good results for bigger state sizes. By changing the threshold, we can increase or decrease the size of pDDT table. For a bigger threshold value, pDDT size is small, and speed of experiment is fast because of smaller search space. However, the tradeoff is that we may miss a few values which are necessary to make a good differential path. On the other hand, for smaller threshold values, pDDT table is large, and the resulting experiment speed is slow because of the bigger search space. That being said, the larger search space might include the values which are necessary to make a good differential path.
APPENDIX I. APPENDIX II. DINUR's ENUMERATION TECHNIQUE FOR KEY RECOVERY ATTACK AGAINST SPECK
Generally for the key recovery of differential cryptanalysis, counting techniques are common. We extract partial key material from outer rounds of the cipher using statistical analysis. However in case of SPECK, Dinur [20] increased the number of rounds attacked with the application of enumaration techniques in the key recovery. The enumeration technique tries all suggestions for the full key proposed by a sub-cipher attack. To describe the attack on SPECK with enumeration technique, we consider the case when m = 2, master key contains 2 words. This attack can be extended to other cases when m = 3 or m = 4. Let us say, we have r-round differential ( x 0 , y 0 ) → ( x r , y r ) of the cipher with probability p. In such case we can proceed to attack as follow: • Request the encryption of p −1 plaintext pairs P and P = P⊕( x 0 , y 0 ) and denote the corresponding ciphertexts by C and C , respectively.
• For the plaintext pairs P and P : Execute the 2 round attack (Section ''The 2-Round Attack'') using ( x r , y r ), C and C and get suggestions for k r+1 and k r . For the suggested value of k r+1 and k r , reverse the key schedule to obtain the master key. Test the master key using additional encryptions and if passes the test return the master key. In the given attack, we need 2 · p −1 plaintexts. The average time complexity is less than 2 encryptions in the key recovery of 2 round attack (Section ''The 2-Round Attack'') and therefore the total time complexity of the attack is 2 · p −1 . For m = 3 or m = 4, by guessing the last m − 2 round keys, we can recover r + m rounds with complexity 2 · p −1 · 2 (m−2)n encryptions.
THE 2-ROUND ATTACK
In this section we present the details of 2 round attack on cipher. We use r-round differential path for this attack. Consider we have initial difference ( x 0 , y 0 ) and final difference ( x r , y r ). We take final differences ( x r , y r ) as the input of 2-round differential attack. We are given actual values of (x r+2 , y r+2 ) and (x r+2 ⊕ x r+2 , y r+2 ⊕ y r+2 ). We try to enumerate possible round keys k r and k r+1 so that partial decryption of 2 round of the pairs (x r+2 , y r+2 ) and (x r+2 ⊕ x r+2 , y r+2 ⊕ y r+2 ) is equal to ( x r , y r ).
The notation we use in our analysis is given in Figure 8 , where the XOR differential notation is given on the left, and the notation of the intermediate encryption values for (x r+2 , y r+2 ) is given on the right.
All the XOR differences in the 2 round scheme can be easily determined. Since x r+1 = y r+1 ⊕ ( y r ≪ β) and y r+1 = ( x r+2 ⊕ y r+2 ) ≫ β can be calculated using known variables. The value of y r+1 = (x r+2 ⊕ y r+2 ) ≫ β can be calculated using the known values of (x r+2 , y r+2 ) whereas x r+1 and (x r , y r ) remains unknown. Finding the values of k r+1 and k r is equivalent to find the values of x r and x r+1 , as k r+1 = (y r+1 (x r+1 ≫ α)) ⊕ x r+2 and as y r = (x r+1 ⊕ y r+1 ) ≫ β, then k r = (y r (x r ≫ α)) ⊕ x r+1 can be derived as well. Therefore we concentrate on finding the intermediate values of x r and x r+1 . The problem of solving differential equations of addition (DEA) of the form (x ⊕ δ 1 ) (y ⊕ δ 2 ) = (x y) ⊕ δ 3 (where δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 are given and x, y are unknown variables) is a basic problem in the analysis of ARX cryptosystems, and was extensively studied in several papers. For SPECK we can also write the same equation and find values of x r and x r+1 , we omit the right circular shift ≫, and then we have two differential equations of addition: (x r ⊕ x r ) (y r ⊕ y r ) = (x r y r ) ⊕ x r+1 (x r+1 ⊕ x r+1 ) (y r+1 ⊕ y r+1 ) = (x r+1 y r+1 ) ⊕ x r+2 where all differences are known, and in the second equation y r+1 and y r+1 ⊕ y r+1 .
